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The Origins of Transhumanism Almost	   a	   decade	   has	   passed	   since	   Nick	   Bostrom	   explained	   that	  transhumanism	  “holds	   that	  current	  human	  nature	   is	   improvable	   through	  the	  use	  of	  applied	  science	  and	  other	  rational	  methods,	  which	  may	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  increase	  human	  health-span,	  extend	  our	  intellectual	  and	  physical	  capacities,	  and	   give	   us	   increased	   control	   over	   our	   own	   mental	   states	   and	   moods” (Bostrom	  2005a,	  202–203).	  Ultimately,	  Bostrom	  believed	  that	  such	  changes	  in	  human	  nature	  could	  “make	  us,	  or	  our	  descendants,	  »posthuman«,	  beings	  who	  may	  have	  indefinite	  health-­‐spans,	  much	  greater	  intellectual	  faculties	  than	  any	  current	  human	  being—and	  perhaps	  entirely	  new	  sensibilities	  or	  modalities—as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  their	  own	  emotions”	  (Bostrom	  2005a,	  203).	  In	  general,	   Bostrom,	   as	   well	   as	   other	   researchers	   such	   as	   Ingmar	   Persson,	  Rebecca	   Roache,	   Julian	   Savulescu,	   Mark	   A.	   Walker,	   dedicated	   their	   work	   to	  understanding,	  developing,	  and	  establishing	  the	  notion	  of	  transhumanism	  not	  only	  as	  “a	  man’s	  responsibility	  and	  destiny—to	  be	  an	  agent	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	   in	   the	   job	   of	   realizing	   its	   inherent	   potentialities	   as	   fully	   as	   possible”	  (Huxley	  2015,	  12),	  but	  rather	  to	  transcend	  these	  inherent	  potentials	  through	  such	   interventions	   that	   will	   result	   in	   attaining	   “at	   least	   one	   posthuman	  capacity,	   [that	   is]	   a	   general	   central	   capacity	   greatly	   exceeding	   the	  maximum	  attainable	  by	  any	  current	  human	  being”	  (Bostrom	  2008,	  107).	  The	  posthuman	  goal	  is	  thus	  not	  to	  achieve	  perfection	  in	  any	  biologically	  or	  socially	  given	  way,	  but	  rather	  to	  overcome	  species-­‐based	  limitations.	  The	   desire	   to	   enhance	   certain	   human	   qualities	   and	   abilities	   is,	  according	   to	   Bostrom,	   not	   an	   idea	   born	   of	   today;	   the	   Swedish	   philosopher	  traces	  its	  roots	  to	  the	  Sumerian	  Epic	  of	  Gilgamesh,	  ancient	  burial	  ceremonies,	  and	   the	   search	   for	   the	  Fountain	  of	  Youth	   and	   the	  Philosopher’s	   Stone.	  All	   of	  the	   aforementioned	   were	   aimed	   at	   extending	   life	   or	   attaining	   biological	  immortality.	  As	  Bostrom	  noted,	  the	  thirst	  for	  eternal	  youth	  is	  inborn	  in	  human	  nature:	   “The	   human	   desire	   to	   acquire	   new	   capacities	   is	   as	   ancient	   as	   our	  species	   itself.	   We	   have	   always	   sought	   to	   expand	   the	   boundaries	   of	   our	  existence,	   be	   it	   socially,	   geographically,	   or	   mentally” (Bostrom	   2005b,	   1).	  These	  desires	  have	  been	  elaborated	   in	   two	  different	  ways:	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   The	  writing	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  was	   funded	   by	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   National	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  (Dec-­‐2013/10/E/HS5/00157).	  




we	  have	  the	  bioconservative	  notion	  of	   transcending	  one’s	  physical	  or	  mental	  limitations	  through	  training,	  education,	  self-­‐assessment	  and	  self-­‐development.	  This	   is	   made	   possible	   through	   the	   ability	   to	   transcend	   one’s	   self	   by	  recognizing	   others	   as	   free	   and	   equal	   subjects:	   “Persons	   can	   therefore	  differentiate	   between	   their	   nature	   and	   themselves;	   they	   can	   transcend	  themselves;	   they	   can	   overcome	   self-­‐centredness…	   .	   Unlike	   animals,	   which	  cannot	   pass	   judgement	   on	   their	   own	   natural	   appetites	   and	   cannot	   choose	  whether	   to	   behave	   in	   accord	  with	   them	  or	   not,	   the	   nature	   of	   persons	   is	   not	  identical	  to	  their	  being	  a	  person”	  (Zaborowski	  2010,	  199).	  In	  effect,	  as	  stated	  already	  by	  Bostrom,	  within	  human	  nature	  lies	  the	  need	  to	  “become	  something	  more”;	   however,	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   transhumanist	   view,	   this	   development	  does	   not	   take	   place	   on	   the	   biological	   plane,	   but	   instead	   has	   a	   metaphysical	  meaning.	  It	  thus	  requires	  not	  technological	  interventions,	  but	  self-­‐control	  and	  self-­‐development	  techniques,	  which	  are	  concentrated	  on	  the	  mental-­‐spiritual	  nature	  of	  humans.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   transhumanists	   argue,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   actually	  attain	   the	   aforementioned	   goals—a	   longer	   lifespan,	   and	   better	   physical,	  mental,	   or	   moral	   capabilities—without	   referring	   to	   scientific	   (specifically,	  biological	   and	   medical)	   means.	   Putting	   it	   simply:	   “You	   will	   never	   turn	   a	  Chihuahua	   into	   a	   Doberman	   through	   grooming,	   training	   and	   affection”	  (Savulescu	   2005,	   36).	   The	   development	   of	   genetics,	   neurosciences,	   and	  medicine	  prove	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  genetic	  foundations	  for	  most	  human	  capabilities	   and	   traits.	   We	   have	   known	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   that	   there	   are	  correlations	   between	   genes	   and	   aggressive	   behaviour;	   it	   would	   thus	   be	  difficult	   for	   some	   to	   overcome	   their	   characters	   flaws	   without	   any	   kind	   of	  medical	   aid.	   Therefore,	   it	  would	   be	   unwise—and	   unfair—to	   leave	   to	   chance	  and	   the	   “genetic	   lottery”	   the	   possibility	   of	   developing	   one’s	   capabilities	   if	   a	  safe	   and	   trustworthy	   technique	   (e.g.,	   genetic	   engineering)	   could	   ameliorate	  one’s	   chances	   of	   having	   a	   satisfying	   life,	   or	   offer	   the	   possibility	   of	   choosing	  from	  a	  multitude	   of	   given	  possibilities	   (see:	   Savulescu	  2001;	  Agar	  1998).	  As	  such,	  transhumanists	  draw	  their	  roots	  from	  the	  Darwinian	  (but	  also,	  to	  some	  small	  extent,	  from	  the	  Galtonian)	  paradigm	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  




evolution	   has	   been	   further	   developed	   by,	   among	   others,	   J.	   B.	   S.	   Haldane,	  	  Theodosius	  Dobzhansky,	  and	  Ernst	  Mayr,	  finally	  assuming	  the	  form	  of	  modern	  evolutionary	  synthesis.	  What	   is	   important	   to	   note	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   subject	   of	   natural	  selection	   is	   not	   the	   individual,	   but	   the	   species.	   The	  mechanism	   of	   evolution	  may	  thus	  be	  described	  as	  follows:	  In	  a	  certain	  environment,	  the	  fractions	  that	  adapt	  to	  given	  conditions	  given	  outlive	  and	  have	  fertile	  offspring,	  while	  those	  that	  do	  not	  adapt	  to	  conditions	  will	  become	  extinct.	  The	  Darwinian	  theory	  of	  evolution	  thus	  aims	  to	  explain	  the	  origins	  of	  species,	  but	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  methodological	   frame	   for	   explaining	   how	   an	   individual	   adapts	   to	   changing	  environmental	   conditions.	   Transhumanism,	   however,	  while	  deeply	   rooted	   in	  the	   Darwinian	   understanding	   of	   evolutionary	   biology,	   values	   highly	   the	  individualistic	  notion	  of	  personal	  liberties	  and	  happiness.	  Such	  a	  combination	  may	  thus	  prove	  difficult	  to	  maintain.	  
Transhumanism and Darwin’s Theory of Evolution It	   is	   possible	   to	   trace	   a	   common	   point	   in	   the	   Darwinian	   and	   transhumanist	  perceptions	  of	  the	  forces	  of	  evolution.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Charles	  T.	  Rubin:	  Transhumanism	  rebels	  against	  the	  randomness	  of	  evolution	  ...	  But	  ...	  transhumanism	  builds	  on	  the	  very	  same	  underlying	  conception	  of	   nature	   that	   the	   Malthusians	   and	   Darwinians	   build	   on,	  vociferously	   rejecting	   the	   thought	   that	   nature	   has	   any	   inherent	  normative	  goals	  or	  purposes.	  While	  it	  rejects	  blind	  evolution	  as	  a	  future	   fate	   for	   man,	   it	   accepts	   it	   as	   the	   origins	   of	   man.	   ...	  Transhumanism	   is	   a	   nihilistic	   response	   to	   the	   nihilism	   of	   the	  Malthusians	  and	  Darwinians	  (Rubin	  2014).	  This	   claim	  may	   be	   further	   illustrated	   if	   we	   acknowledge	   the	   fact	   that	   some	  proponents	  of	  human	  genetic	  enhancement	  draw	  their	  roots	  from	  nineteenth-­‐century	  eugenic	  claims.	  As	  Nicholas	  Agar	  wrote	  in	  1998:	  “Recent	  advances	  in	  the	   understanding	   of	   human	   heredity	   offered	   by	   the	   new	   genetics	   have	  prompted	  a	  revival	  in	  eugenics”	  (Agar	  1998,	  137).	  The	  assumed	  restoration	  of	  eugenics,	   improved	  through	  a	   liberal	  account,	   is	  being	  accomplished	  through	  Darwinian	   means:	   the	   impact	   the	   parental	   generation	   may	   have	   on	   filial	  generations.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  transhumanist	  claim	  may	  seem	  legible	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Darwinian	  theory	  of	  evolution.	  What	  transhumanists	  wish	  to	  achieve	  is,	   inter	  
alia,	   the	   eradication	   of	   diseases	   of	   genetic	   origin	   (especially	   single-­‐gene	  disorders,	   as	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  precisely	   identify	   the	   allele	   responsible	   for	   the	  disease),	   extending	   human	   lifespan,	   etc.	   These	   goals	   are,	   in	   light	   of	   the	  Darwinian	  theory	  of	  evolution,	  not	  only	  goods	   in	  themselves,	  but	  also	  means	  to	  an	  end:	  the	  chance	  to	  have	  fertile	  offspring.	  We	  may	  safely	  assume	  that	  such	  features	   as	   long	   life,	   general	   healthiness	   (or	   at	   least	   being	   free	   of	   genetic	  








On	  this	  account,	  we	  may	  ascertain	  that	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  for	  at	  least	  some	  of	  those	  being	  enhanced	  to	  actually	  exceed	  human	  biological	  nature	  and	  become	   the	   founders	   of	   a	   new	   species:	   the	   posthuman.	   As	   observed	   by	  Bostrom,	  there	  are	  some	  obvious	  limitations	  to	  this	  perspective:	  some	  modes	  of	   posthuman	   being	   are	   not	  worthwhile	   to	   pursue	   and	   some	  may	   in	   fact	   be	  dangerous.	  Still,	   it	   is	  advisable	  to	  follow	  a	  course	  of	  action	  that	  would	  enable	  us	   to	   live	   a	   posthuman	   life.	   This	   course	   of	   action	   demands	   we	   embrace	  technological	   progress	   and	   make	   available	   all	   its	   achievements	   to	   both	  individuals	   (self-­‐enhancement)	   and	   prospective	   parents	   (future	   child	  enhancement).	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  becomes	  visible	  that	  the	  reluctance	  towards	  the	  “natural	  genetic	  lottery”	  that	  is	  often	  expressed	  by	  transhumanists	  does	  in	  fact	  somehow	   support	   the	   “production”	   logic	   of	   which	   they	   are	   accused	   by	  Habermas.	  As	  noted	  by	  Bostrom:	  “The	  horrors	  of	  nature	  in	  general,	  and	  of	  our	  own	   nature	   in	   particular,	   are	   so	  well	   documented	   that	   it	   is	   astonishing	   that	  somebody	  …	  should	  still	  in	  this	  day	  and	  age	  be	  tempted	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  natural	  as	  a	  guide	  as	  to	  what	  is	  desirable	  or	  normatively	  right” (Bostrom	  2005a,	  205).	  A	  broad	  comment	  can	  be	  made	  regarding	  Bostrom’s	  remark.	  Firstly,	   Bostrom	   seems	   not	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   difference	   between	  what	  is	  desirable	  and	  what	  is	  normatively	  right.	  To	  admit	  that	  what	  is	  natural	  is	   normatively	   right	   is—obviously—a	   claim	   that	   is	   difficult	   to	  maintain.	   The	  aforementioned	  notion	  of	  genetic	  correlations	  of	  aggressive	  behaviour	  may	  be	  utilised	   to	   excuse	   or	   justify,	   in	   some	   cases,	   such	   actions	   and	   attitudes.	  However,	   it	   would	   be	   impossible	   to	   maintain	   that	   such	   a	   correlation	   has	   a	  normative	  value:	  aggressive	  behaviour	  may	  have	  been	  a	  valuable	  capacity	  for	  survival	   in	   unfriendly	   and	   highly	   competitive	   environments.	   Since	   humans	  obtained	  the	  capacity	  to	  reflect,	  it	  is	  untenable	  for	  human	  species	  to	  maintain	  such	  an	  attitude,	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  think,	  plan,	  and	  cooperate	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  even	   better	   for	   maximising	   chances	   to	   adapt	   (see:	   Sussman,	   Garber,	   &	  Cheverud	   2005).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   admit	   that,	   in	   certain	  cases,	  acting	  in	  an	  aggressive	  manner	  would	  be	  desirable.	  Desirable	  traits	  and	  capacities	  may	  not	   fit	   into	  any	  kind	  of	  normativity,	  which	  does	  not	  mean	  we	  would	  not	  perceive	  them	  as	  desirable.	  As	  observed	  by	  Robert	  Spaemann:	  “We	  have	   to	   personally	   want	   to	   draw	   even	   the	   most	   obvious	   conclusions” (Spaemann	   2012,	   194).	   Thus,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   conclude	   that	   we	   may	  simultaneously	   affirm	   that,	   although	  we	  do	  desire	   some	  of	   them	   for	   reasons	  other	   than	  moral,	   certain	   traits	   and	   capacities,	   originating	   from	   the	   natural	  constitution	  of	  human	  species,	  do	  not	  fall	  into	  any	  normative	  order.	  	  It	   is	   still	   possible,	   however,	   to	   make	   a	   more	   subtle,	   yet	   equally	  important	   remark	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   Darwinian	   evolution.	   As	   stated	  earlier,	  the	  basic	  and	  unique	  rule	  of	  Darwinian	  evolution	  is	  natural	  selection:	  those	   factions	   of	   a	   species	   which	   maximise	   their	   adaptation	   to	   existing	  conditions,	   will	   endure	   and	   have	   fertile	   offspring;	   other	   factions	   will,	  consequently,	   become	   extinct.	   If	  we	   take	   this	   theorem	   seriously,	  we	   can	   see	  








The	   posthumanist	   scheme	   of	   “steering	   evolution”	   is	   thus	   attained	  through	  means	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  impact	  individuals	  selectively.	  The	  notion	  of	   utilising	   genetic	   selection	   and	   engineering,	   as	  well	   as	   other	   technological	  means,	   is	   applicable	   to	   individuals	   only	   in	   two	   senses:	   Firstly,	   it	   is	   morally	  unacceptable	   to	   think	   of	   a	   global,	   general,	   state-­‐planned	   mechanism	   of	  enhancement,	   as	   it	  would	   inevitably	   fall	   into	   the	   fallacies	   of	   early-­‐twentieth	  century	  eugenics	  programme:	  “Old	  fashioned	  authoritarian	  eugenicists	  sought	  to	  produce	  citizens	  out	  of	  a	  single	  centrally	  designed	  mould,	  the	  distinguishing	  mark	   of	   the	   new	   liberal	   eugenics	   is	   state	   neutrality.	   …	   Authoritarian	  eugenicists	   would	   do	   away	   with	   ordinary	   procreative	   freedoms.	   Liberals	  instead	  propose	  radical	  extensions	  of	   them”	  (Agar	  1998,	  137).	  Secondly,	   it	   is	  precisely	   the	   concept	   of	   reproductive	   freedom,	   originating	   in	   the	   concept	   of	  human	   rights	   (see:	   Freedman	   &	   Isaacs	   1993),	   that	   creates	   the	   theoretical	  mainframe	  for	  human	  enhancement	  discussions.	  In	  sum,	  transhumanists	  seem	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  creating	  a	  new	   species	   through	   individual	   decisions	   for	   enhancement.	   This	   view,	  however,	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  Darwinian	  theory	  of	  evolution,	  which,	  as	  has	  already	  been	  stressed,	  takes	  a	  broader	  perspective	  on	  how	  species	  as	  a	  whole	  react	   to	   changing	   (or	   stable)	   environmental	   conditions.	   These	   reactions	   are	  then	   “evaluated”	   through	   the	  mechanism	   of	   natural	   selection,	  which	   is	   then	  either	  the	  origin	  of	  a	  species	  (those	  already	  existing	  or	  truly	  new	  ones)	  or	  its	  demise.	   For	   Darwin	   and	   his	   successors,	   there	   is	   few	   or	   no	   attention	  whatsoever	   given	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	   individuals	   react	   to	   their	  environment	   and	  how	   they	  adapt	  on	   the	   individual	   level	   to	   stress	   and	  other	  factors.	   This	   is	   precisely	   the	   point	   at	  which	   the	  Darwinian	   understanding	   of	  evolution	   and	   the	   transhumanists	   part	   ways—to	   the	   disadvantage	   of	   the	  latter,	  it	  seems.	  
Transhumanism and Lamarckism The	  transhumanist	  perspective	  on	  evolution,	  however—understood	  in	  terms	   of	   individual	   change	   and	   adaptation—is	   not	   new.	   At	   the	   turn	   of	   the	  eitheenth	   and	   nineteenth	   centuries,	   the	   French	   naturalist	   Jean-­‐Baptiste	   de	  Lamarck	  wrote	  his	  classic	  work	  Zoological	  Philosophy:	  Exposition	  with	  Regard	  
to	  the	  Natural	  History	  of	  Animals,	   in	  which	  he	  developed	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  Darwinian	   concept	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   living	   beings.	   His	   theory	   may	   be	  summarised	   in	   three	   general	   concepts:	   “(1)	   the	   notion	   of	   degradation;	   (2)	  issue	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   «species»;	   (3)	   the	   concept	   of	   transmutation,	   or	  evolution”	   (Łastowski	   2009,	   259),	   the	   latter	   of	   which	   was	   based	   on	   two	  notions:	   that	   of	   heredity,	   and	   that	   of	   adaptation:	   “The	   first	   one	   refers	   to	  relations,	   that	   occur	   between	   breeding	   individuals;	   the	   second	   asses	   the	  reaction	  of	   individuals	   to	   the	  requirements	  of	   the	   life	  conditions”	  (Łastowski	  2004,	   65).	   These	   two	   factors	   do	   not	   act	   separately,	   but	   instead	   have	   a	  




complimentary	   impact	   on	   living	   beings.	   Thus,	   evolution,	   according	   to	  Lamarck,	  is	  an	  “interplay	  between	  two	  powerful	  factors:	  the	  innate	  heritability	  of	  characteristics	  acquired	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  environment	  (l’influence	  




speak	   of	  modes	   of	   [posthuman]	   being	  having	   a	   value”	   (Bostrom	  2008,	   110).	  Posthuman	  capacities	  and	  traits,	  according	  to	  Bostrom,	  are	  generally	  valuable,	  and	  thus	  not	  context-­‐dependent.	  What	   makes	   the	   transhumanist	   perspective	   close	   to	   the	   Lamarckian	  concept	  of	  evolution	  is	  precisely	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  main	  actor	  in	  evolutionary	   processes	   and	   on	   individualistic	   ways	   of	   adapting	   to	   given	  conditions	  as	   fuelling	  evolutionary	  change.	  These	  notions	  however,	  as	  stated	  earlier,	   are	   of	   no	   real	   significance	   in	   either	   Darwinian	   or	   modern	   neo-­‐Darwinian	   theories	   of	   evolution.	   In	   effect,	   we	  may	   assert	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  dangerous	  gap	  between	  the	  transhumanist	  vision	  of	  evolution	  (and	  thus	  how	  to	  impact	  or	  steer	  it)	  and	  biological	  knowledge	  of	  these	  processes.	  Such	  a	  gap	  obviously	  does	  not	  favour	  a	  favourable	  reading	  of	  transhumanist	  proposals	  by	  biologists,	   physicians,	   and	   other	   members	   of	   the	   natural	   sciences,	   which	   is	  crucial	  for	  the	  success	  of	  posthumanity.	  
Success Comes at a Price We	  can	  make	  a	  further	  remark	  on	  the	  ideals	  to	  which	  transhumanists	  aspire,	  based	  on	  recent	   findings	   in	  molecular	  biology	  and	  genetics.	  A	  complex	  study	  led	   by	   Joel	   Dudley	   revealed	   that	   certain	   parts	   of	   our	   genome,	   called	   human	  accelerated	   regions,	   or	   HARs,2	   may	   incline	   individuals	   to	   develop	  schizophrenia.	  Both	  schizophrenia	  and	  HARs	  appear	  to	  be,	   for	  the	  most	  part,	  human-­‐specific.	  What	   is	  more,	   schizophrenia-­‐related	  genes	   sit	   close	   to	  HARs	  along	   the	  human	  genome.	  Furthermore,	   it	  was	   revealed	   that	  HAR-­‐associated	  schizophrenia	   genes	   were	   under	   stronger	   evolutionary	   selective	   pressure	  than	   other	   schizophrenia	   genes.	   This	   observation	   implies	   that	   the	   human	  variants	  of	  these	  genes	  are	  essential	  to	  us	  in	  some	  way,	  despite	  the	  risks	  they	  harbour.	   The	   study	   led	   by	   Dudley	   and	   collaborators	   found	   that	   HAR-­‐associated	   schizophrenia	   genes	   are	   found	   in	   regions	   of	   the	   genome	   that	  influence	   other	   genes	   expressed	   in	   the	   prefrontal	   cortex,	   a	   brain	   region	   just	  behind	   the	   forehead	   that	   is	   involved	   in	   higher-­‐order	   thinking.	   Impaired	  function	   in	   the	   prefrontal	   cortex	   is	   thought	   to	   contribute	   to	   psychosis.	   They	  also	   found	   that	   these	   culprit	   genes	   are	   involved	   in	   various	   key	   human	  neurological	  functions	  within	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (see:	  Xu	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Stetka	  2015).	   The	  conclusions	  derived	  from	  these	  findings	  will	  inevitably	  vary.	  Some	  may	   assume	   that	   the	   possible	   genetic	   link	   between	   high-­‐order	   thinking	   and	  schizophrenia	   somehow	   confirms	   the	   colloquial	   stereotype	   that	   links	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   “Human	   accelerated	   regions	   (HARs)	   are	   DNA	   sequences	   that	   changed	   very	   little	  throughout	  mammalian	  evolution,	  but	  then	  experienced	  a	  burst	  of	  changes	  in	  humans	  since	   divergence	   from	   chimpanzees.	   This	   unexpected	   evolutionary	   signature	   is	  suggestive	   of	   deeply	   conserved	   function	   that	   was	   lost	   or	   changed	   on	   the	   human	  lineage”	  (Hubisz	  &	  Pollard	  2014,	  15).	  




greatness	  of	   some	  kind	   (specifically—high	   cognitive	   capabilities	   that	   are	   the	  basis	   for	  acknowledging	  someone	  as	  being	  a	  genius)	  with	  some	  sort	  of	  brain	  dysfunction—this	  belief	  having	  been	  proven	  false.	  Some	  may	  see	  this	   finding	  as	   an	   opportunity	   for	   better	   understanding	   the	  mechanisms	   involved	   in	   the	  development	  of	  schizophrenia.	  The	  findings	  of	  Dudley	  et	  al.	  may,	  however,	  be	  of	  importance	  in	  relation	  to	  transhumanist	  claims.	  In	   assuming	   that	   it	   is	  worthwhile	   to	   provide	   both	   ourselves	   and	   our	  future	   children	   with	   greater	   cognitive	   abilities	   (those	   including	   better	  memory,	   greater	   capacity	   to	   do	   elaborated	   analysis,	   and	   others),	   we	   assert	  that	  these	  enhancements	  should	  come	  with	  an	  acceptable	  level	  of	  risk.	  These	  risks	  would	   include	   the	  possibility	  of	   technically	   failing	   to	  achieve	  what	  was	  intended	   (i.e.,	   enhancement	   technologies	   being	   abused),	   but	   also,	   and	  more	  importantly,	   the	   possibility	   of	   outcomes	   that	   are	   harmful	   rather	   than	  liberating.	   If	   such	   a	   reservation	   is	   being	   made—and	   we	   have	   in	   mind	   the	  broad	   horizon	   of	   species	   evolution—we	   may	   arrive	   at	   the	   disturbing	  conclusion	   that	   while	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   steer	   our	   species’	   evolution	   in	   a	  harmful	  manner,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  actually	  assess	  all	  the	  possible	  risks	  of	  genetic	  engineering	   and	   other	   enhancement	   technologies.	   As	   for	   genetic	  enhancement,	   it	   is	   worthwhile	   recalling	   that	   although	   “our	   fate	   is	   written	  rather	  in	  genes	  than	  in	  the	  stars,”	  it	  is	  not	  a	  single	  gene	  but	  a	  constellation	  of	  genes	  that	  are	  “coupled	  together	  with	  other	  genes,	  in	  their	  closest	  vicinity;	  but	  also	  distant	  ones,	   from	  far-­‐lying	  chromosomes”	  (Szczeklik	  2003,	  28).	  Thus,	   it	  may	   prove	   difficult	   to	   evaluate	   with	   a	   satisfactory	   degree	   of	   precision	   all	  possible	   risks	   and	  dangers.	  An	   analogous	   claim	  may	  be	  made	   towards	  other	  enhancement	   techniques:	   They	   would	   probably	   not	   truly	   augment	   our	  capabilities,	  but	  rather	  prove	  to	  be	  only	  mere	  gadgets,	  as	  none	  of	  them	  would	  actually	  impact	  our	  biological,	  evolutionary-­‐determined	  condition.	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Abstract.	  In	  the	  paper,	  I	  discuss	  the	  possible	  gap	  between	  the	  transhumanist	  perspective	  of	   controlling	   and	  perfecting	  human	  evolution	   through	   scientific	  means	  and	  the	  Darwinian	  and	  neo-­‐Darwinian	  theory	  of	  biological	  evolution.	  I	  argue	   that,	   due	   to	   such	   gap,	   the	   transhumanist	   programme	   is	   flawed	   and	  requires	  a	  new	  and	  better	  understanding	  of	  biological	  mechanisms	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  its	  goals.	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